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ABSTRACT
Background and aims During the past three decades an expansive literature has emerged that is dedicated to analysing
the processes of policy transfer. One neglected pathway involves subnational agents emulating crime control innovations
that have emerged in subnational jurisdictions of other nations. This paper presents the case of the London Mayor’s Ofﬁce
for Policing and Crime’s (MOPAC) Alcohol Abstinence Monitoring Requirement (AAMR) Pilot to examine the multi-level
factors that facilitate and/or constrain international–subnational crime and justice policy transfer.Methods A qualita-
tive case study design reconstructed the (in)formal events that led to components of the South Dakota 24/7 Sobriety
Project (USA) being either abandoned or integrated into MOPAC’s AAMR Pilot. Evidence is drawn from elite interviews
and documentarymaterials.Results A series of inter/transnational-, macro-domestic-, meso- andmicro-level factors en-
abled and/or obstructed processes of complete international–subnational policy transfer. Exclusion of domestic violence
perpetrators from the London Pilot was fuelled by interest-group hostility andmobilization. Use of alcohol tags rather than
breathalysers to monitor compliance was a result of political–economic constraints, concern surrounding intrusion, tech-
nological innovation and policy-orientated learning. The decision to omit an ‘offender pays’ funding mechanism was a
consequence of legal incompatibility and civil service reluctance, while ‘ﬂash incarceration’ for breach was not imple-
mented due to European policy harmonization. Conclusions The London Alcohol Abstinence Monitoring Requirement
Pilot was a policy ‘synthesis’ that combined ideas, goals, vocabulary, principles, technology and practices from the South
Dakota model with the existing English and Welsh criminal justice framework. Structural factors and the actions of
particular agents limited the extent to which policy transfer occurred.
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INTRODUCTION
The claim that crime control policies ‘travel’ is common-
place, but one that is rarely supported by empirical evi-
dence. Indeed, despite assertions that a plethora of
foreign innovations have been borrowed by policymakers
in the United Kingdom, few studies have been conducted
that directly examine the occurrence and realities of crime
and justice policy transfer, deﬁned here as:
A process in which knowledge about crime and justice
institutions, policies or delivery systems in one
jurisdiction is used in the development of crime and
justice institutions, policies or delivery systems in
another jurisdiction in a different country (deﬁnition
adapted from [1]).
Instead, hunches pertaining to the overseas origins of policy
initiatives such as drug courts, mandatory drug testing for ar-
restees, restorative justice, day ﬁnes, problem-orientated
policing, civil gang injunctions, boot camps, Neighbourhood
Watch, Ugly Mugs and street wardens generally prevail.
Those studies that have been published have primarily
focused on the national level, and explore associations and
similarities between crime control policy in the United
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Kingdom and the United States; see [2–6]. Focus on the
United States has largely been a consequence of, and contrib-
utor to, heightened criminological interest in the ‘Americani-
zation’ of UK policymaking and the associated convergence
and divergence in crime control debate—that is, a debate that
concerns the extent, causes and implications of globalization
with regard to criminal justice and penal policy [4]. Arguably,
however, persistent focus on national-level developments and
neglect of the phenomenon of international–subnational
crime and justice policy transfer is problematic for two rea-
sons. First, policy change can, and does, emerge in a
bottom-up rather than top-down fashion, with subnational
agents such as those associated with local or regional admin-
istrations cultivating interventions that are subsequently
adopted by central government or that diffuse horizontally
across localities [5,7–11]. Secondly, the police accountability
and governance reforms introduced by the UK Coalition
Government (2010–15) have ostensibly created a new oppor-
tunity structure for crime and justice policy transfer to occur
by placing directly elected Police and Crime Commissioners
(PCCs) into a subnational strategic leadership position. Given
that PCCs may prove to be key agents of policy emulation
over time [12], questions pertaining to the processes of
international–subnational crime and justice policy transfer ar-
guably require answers. In analysing the case of the London
Mayor’s Ofﬁce for Policing and Crime’s (MOPAC) Alcohol
Abstinence Monitoring Requirement (AAMR) Pilot, this pa-
per takes steps to address one such question: speciﬁcally,
what factors facilitate and/or constrain the adoption and im-
plementation of an overseas subnational crime and justice in-
novation in the United Kingdom? It will be argued that a
series of multi-level factors enabled and/or hindered the trans-
fer of the 24/7 Sobriety Project from South Dakota to
London, leading to some elements of the project being emu-
lated and others being adapted or abandoned.
THE SOUTH DAKOTA 24/7 SOBRIETY
PROJECT AND MOPAC’S AAMR PILOT
In 2008, Kit Malthouse was appointed by the Mayor of
London, Boris Johnson, to be his DeputyMayor for Policing.
At this time, two strands of interpersonal violence in
London appeared to be bucking national crime trends by
not declining: violence that was occurring within the
night-time economy and domestic violence [13]. In
searching for a solution, Malthouse attended the eighth
Oxford Policing Policy Forum (OPPF). This Forum was
established in 2006 as a joint initiative of the Centre for
Criminology at the University of Oxford and the indepen-
dent think-tank, the Police Foundation. Its purpose is to
provide a safe space for senior stakeholders to network
and to have an informal and energetic ‘warts-and-all’ de-
bate under Chatham House Rules about policing issues
[14]. Participation is via direct invitation only. In light of
the increase in drug- and alcohol-related crime in the
United Kingdom and the reactive publication of a drug
law enforcement strategy developed by the now disbanded
UK Drug Policy Commission, the theme of the OPPF
attended by Malthouse was Policing drugs and alcohol: is
harm reduction the way forward? [14]. It was during this
event that hewas introduced to the South Dakota 24/7 So-
briety Project by Professor Jonathan P. Caulkins (Carnegie
Mellon University). In delivering a presentation at the out-
set of the OPPF, Professor Caulkins included a succinct sec-
tion that was dedicated to outlining ‘24/7 Sobriety’, along
with a series of descriptive statistics pertaining to the efﬁ-
cacy of this coerced alcohol abstinence strategy [14,15].
24/7 Sobriety emerged in Bennett County, a rural ju-
risdiction in South Dakota, United States. The County’s
prosecutor, Larry Long, identiﬁed that almost every crime
committed in his region was linked to alcohol, and that
the same individuals were being repeatedly sentenced
and released from jail [16]. To alleviate this revolving-door
situation, Long devised an approach to address alcohol-
related crime and recidivism, in particular drink-driving
and domestic violence. The idea was simple. Defendants
who had demonstrated that their alcohol intake was a
threat to public safety would have their ‘licence to drink’
suspended in the same way that those who fail to operate
a vehicle responsibly have their driving licence revoked
[17]. With cooperation from a local judge, Long’s project
launched in 1985. As a condition of bond and until their
cases were resolved, defendants were required to present
themselves twice daily, 7 days a week, at a sheriff ’s ofﬁce
and undertake a breath test for a reading of their blood–
alcohol concentration levels. Those who tested positive
(i.e. ‘blew hot’) or who failed to show up for a scheduled
test (i.e. ‘no shows’) were ‘ﬂash incarcerated’ in the
county jail, typically for a few days. The initial results of
Long’s method were considered encouraging. Not only
did individuals attend as required, but a high proportion
blew negative tests, including some deemed to be
alcohol-dependent [18]. Moreover, the jail population
decreased and drink-driving and domestic violence rates
declined across the county [19].
Long relocated to Pierre (the state capital of South Da-
kota) in 1991 and was later elected Attorney General. In
2003/4 he was appointed to a task-force charged with re-
ducing the state prison population. Having recognized
that substance misuse continued to lie behind much of
the work of the criminal justice system, he suggested that
an initiative similar to his Bennett County project be
piloted. The 24/7 Sobriety Project began in February
2005 in three counties. The pilot initially targeted drink-
driving defendants with at least one prior drink-driving
conviction within the previous 10 years. Software was de-
veloped to track the results of each defendant’s test data,
and participants helped to support the cost of the initiative
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by paying $1 per test. Judges in the pilot jurisdictions con-
sidered 24/7 Sobriety to be a success and, via word of
mouth, the project began diffusing to other South Dakota
counties [17]. Expansion of the project, however, pre-
sented a number of design challenges. Some defendants
had to drive up to 50 miles to be tested because they lived
or worked in a rural location that did not have a local jail
or sufﬁcient law enforcement personnel to administer the
breathalysers [16,18]. Other defendants worked unusual
hours or had transport issues, which made it burdensome
for them to report to the test site on time. To resolve these
difﬁculties, those defendants for whom breath testing was
unfeasible were issued with transdermal alcohol monitor-
ing devices (alcohol tags). An additional complication en-
countered was that while intensive monitoring was
keeping defendants sober, some were opting to use illegal
and prescription drugs as an alcohol substitute [16,19].
As a result, sweat patches and random urinal testing were
introduced into the project. In 2007 the South Dakota
legislature unanimously approved the creation of a state-
wide 24/7 Sobriety programme administered by the
Attorney General’s Ofﬁce. The legislation permitted the
use of 24/7 Sobriety conditions for all crimes in which
alcohol and/or drugs played a role in their commission,
and widened eligibility to incorporate probationers and
parolees as part of their supervision. The 2007 legislation
similarly modiﬁed state law to permit juvenile court judges
involved in abuse or neglect cases to enrol caregivers
into the 24/7 Sobriety testing regime as a condition of
returning children to their home.
Following his attendance at the OPPF, Malthouse
instructed his team within the Greater London Authority
to undertake desk research into the architecture and out-
comes of 24/7 Sobriety. Then, in late 2010, he commenced
a London compulsory sobriety pilot campaign. At the heart
of his vision were the core components of the South Dakota
model: court-mandated alcohol abstinence; regular moni-
toring; offender pays; and ‘swift, certain and fair’ punish-
ment for breach. Domestic abusers were highlighted as
potential pilot participants, along with drink-drivers and
night-time economy offenders. Four years later, under the
leadership of Malthouse’s successor, Stephen Greenhalgh,
MOPAC launched an AAMR Pilot in the South London
Local Justice Area. As illustrated in Table 1, the structure
of this pilot was somewhat different to that proposed previ-
ously. Compulsory sobriety was not utilized as a post-
release license condition; the AAMR period was shorter
than that initially proposed; alcohol tags rather than
breathalysers were adopted to ensure compliance; and of-
fender pays and ‘swift, certain and fair’ punishment for vi-
olations were omitted. In addition, domestic violence
perpetrators were excluded from participating.
POLICY TRANSFER ANALYSIS
Within the mainstream policy transfer literature ﬁve main
analytical approaches can be detected: process-centred,
comparative, ideational, practice-based and multi-level
[20]. While all these approaches have strengths and weak-
nesses, it is multi-level analysis that is arguably the most
Table 1 The London ‘Compulsory Sobriety’ Pilot.
Proposed, 2010 Implemented, 2014
Criminal justice sentence
• Community Order or post-release licence condition
• Duration: 1–2 years (depending on compliance)
• Community or Suspended Order: punitive requirement. The
AAMR can standalone or can be combined with other
requirements
• Duration: ﬁxed period (not exceeding 120 days)
Alcohol monitoring
• Twice-daily breathalysing at police stations
• Offender to pay £1 for each breathalyser test
• Alcohol tags
• Offenders did not pay for their monitoring
Violations
• Police to escort the offender to a custody suite or prison
• Flash incarceration and prompt appearance before a judge/
magistrate who decides on a punishment (including prison)
• Probation service ofﬁcer supervision
• Standard English and Welsh breach processes (ﬁrst breach =
warning; second breach = breach proceedings commence)
Target offenders
• Anyone convicted of an alcohol-related crime, but in particular
night-time economy offenders, domestic violence perpetrators
and those who drink and drive
• Judicial decision. However, violent individuals, night-time
economy offenders and drink-drivers were identiﬁed by MOPAC
as potential targets
• Domestic violence perpetrators, dependent drinkers and those
with speciﬁc medical conditions were excluded
Sources: [13,57,71,75–83]. MOPAC = Mayor’s Ofﬁce for Policing and Crime; AAMR = Alcohol Abstinence Monitoring Requirement.
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comprehensive and sophisticated. Scholars associated with
this tradition seek to understand the outcomes of policy
transfer by examining structure and agency across differ-
ent levels, ranging from the inter/transnational-level to
the micro-level. Prominent multi-level policy transfer
models have been generated by Dolowitz & Marsh [21]
and Evans & Davies [22]. Combined, these models distin-
guish a number of factors that can facilitate and/or con-
strain policy borrowing including, inter alia, language
similarities; institutional and ideological compatibility;
economic and technical feasibility; past policies; policy
complexity; political leadership; and the inﬂuence of
networks. Both these models also recognize that policy im-
portation rarely results in photocopying (i.e. the pure repli-
cation of a programme). Instead, ‘soft’ (e.g. ideas, attitudes,
rhetoric) or ‘hard’ (e.g. tools, practices) elements of
non-indigenous schemes are typically fused with existing
domestic programmes and practices to create a locally
sensitive policy hybrid.
Following a brief description of methods, the remainder
of this paper adopts a multi-level framework to analyse the
factors that enabled and/or hindered processes of
international–subnational policy transfer from South
Dakota to South London, and that resulted in the design
Table 2 Multi-level facilitating and/or constraining factors.
Global and inter/transnational level
(F) New crime control technology
Alcohol tags were commercially available in the UK
(F) Globalization
The internet and transatlantic travel enabled policy tourism within the Greater London Authority
Macro-state level
(F) English and Welsh penal culture and public opinion
Neoliberal political economy; positive attitude of London residents concerning the notion of enforced alcohol abstinence
(F) Large prison population
Incarceration costs were posing a challenge to the state’s budget
(F)(C) Central government agenda
Alcohol-related crime had been elevated to the ‘problem’ sphere; localism was a policy initiative; Transforming Rehabilitation
was an implementation priority
(C) Centralization
Central government is responsible for formulating English and Welsh penal policy. Malthouse and his team were seeking to
exercise inﬂuence in a policy area beyond their regional remit
(C) Past policies and legal compatibility
New primary legislation was required to permit regular alcohol testing and offender pays
(C) Global ﬁnancial crisis
The Coalition Government was delivering an austerity programme—AAMR pilot monies were not available
Meso-level
(F) Mobilization of elite allies
A cross-party compulsory sobriety advocacy coalition formed with the objective of securing AAMR legislation
(F) Inﬂuence
The Greater London Authority is situated within a site of political power (London) and has a high-proﬁle ﬁgurehead (the
Mayor of London) who is responsible for a large geographic area
(F)(C) Political ‘games’
Parliamentary whipping; policy bargaining; media engagement; breaking promises; stalling; thwarting implementation plans
(F)(C) Professional, political and media receptivity
No signiﬁcant media backlash or opposition from alcohol experts
(C) Whitehall receptivity and culture
Aversion to risk and radical policy change; reluctance to introduce new sentences; prejudice concerning innovations that
have emerged in the United States; dismissal of the 24/7 Sobriety evidence base; lack of intellectual seduction
Micro-level
(F)(C) Personality traits and qualities of agents of transfer
Stubbornness; determination; tenacity
(F)(C) Leadership changes
Key agents left their positions within the Ministry of Justice and MOPAC
(C) Ministerial receptivity
Secretary of State for Justice➔ legislative territoriality; anti-localism; cynicism regarding the 24/7 Sobriety cause-and-effect
model; attitude and values
Home Secretary➔ legislative territoriality; concerns pertaining to the burden that would be placed on the police
F = facilitator; C = constraint; MOPAC = Mayor’s Ofﬁce for Policing and Crime; AAMR = Alcohol Abstinence Monitoring Requirement.
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of MOPAC’s AAMR Pilot morphing over time. Structure
and agency are examined across four dimensions: the
global and inter/transnational level; the macro-state level;
the meso-level; and the micro-level. Discussion is initially
focused on factors that aided and/or obstructed broader
transfer processes, before moving to the factors that led to
domestic abusers being deemed ineligible for inclusion in
the pilot and alcohol tags being utilized as the solemonitor-
ing technology. The factors that led to two core elements of
24/7 Sobriety—offender pays and ‘swift, certain, and fair’
punishment—being abandoned will then be presented.
METHODS
Consistent with an exploratory case study design [23], data
were collected to enable the (in)formal events behind the
development and implementation of MOPAC’s AAMR Pilot
to be reconstructed. Two complementary sources of evi-
dence were triangulated using a cross-checking approach
to increase trustworthiness and credibility: elite interviews
and documentary materials [24–26]. In total, 25 qualita-
tive time-line interviews (see [27,28] were conducted with
political, professional, business or administrative elites who
were directly involved in, or who were knowledgeable
about, the pilot. While anonymity was offered to inter-
viewees, 17 were content to be identiﬁed, including: Kit
Malthouse (see above); Baroness Finlay of Llandaff; Profes-
sor Keith Humphreys (Stanford University); Joe Mitton
(Special Adviser, Greater London Authority), Matthew
Mitchell (UK Country Manager, Alcohol Monitoring Sys-
tems Ltd); Amit Sethi (AAMR Project Manager, MOPAC);
and Karyn McCluskey (Director, Scottish Violence
Reduction Unit). The primary objective of the interviews
was to capture ﬁrst-hand insider perspectives concerning
the complex processes of policy formation and change
[25–32]. Supporting case construction, approximately
200 primary, secondary and tertiary documents were re-
trieved, including: Acts of Parliament, Bills, Statutory
Instruments and Green and White Papers, political mani-
festos, speeches, evaluation reports, minutes from meet-
ings, letters, newspaper articles, academic publications,
websites and blogs.
RESULTS
Findings indicate that a series of factors facilitated and/or
constrained crime and justice policy transfer with regard
to MOPAC’s AAMR Pilot. As illustrated in Table 2, these
factors can be conceptualized within a multi-level schema.
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE PERPETRATORS
Evidence suggests that the decision to exclude domestic
violence perpetrators from MOPAC’s AAMR trial was a
product of meso-level resistance from the UK Violence
Against Women and Girls (VAWG) community, and was
made after a multi-agency compulsory sobriety lobbying
alliance (see [12]) had persuaded the Coalition Govern-
ment to include AAMR legislation within the Legal Aid,
Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012. To
expand, although some VAWG experts had not expressed
strong views or had offered contingent support towards
Malthouse’s aspiration to import enforced alcohol absti-
nence, others had been expressing hostility towards
emulating 24/7 Sobriety in London for quite some time
[33–36]. Nevertheless, it was subsequent to statements be-
ing made in the House of Lords that suggested that domes-
tic violence specialists overwhelmingly backed the notion
of imposing compulsory sobriety on domestic abusers that
13 VAWG organizations issued a Joint Statement convey-
ing their disapproval [37]. This interest-group mobilization
led to a meeting being held that was attended by a range of
AAMR stakeholders, including central government
ofﬁcials. While not quarrelling with the notion that the
severity of an assault can be greater when a perpetrator
has consumed alcohol or other substances, VAWG
Table 3 Objections articulated by the VAWG community.
Messaging • Patriarchy is the cause of domestic violence, not alcohol. Sobriety will not address the root causes of a perpetrator’s
behaviour
• Perpetrators may blame alcohol for their actions rather than taking responsibility for their own thoughts and
choices
Risk • Avictim may choose not to adopt particular measures or ﬂee from a life-threatening situation due to the mistaken
belief that they are safer because their partner is not consuming alcohol
• The AAMRwill simply produce a ‘sober abuser’ who is still capable of inﬂicting physical, emotional, psychological,
sexual and ﬁnancial abuse
• Perpetrators may seek revenge on victims for their sentence
Support services • Long waiting-lists mean that perpetrator programmes are unlikely to be delivered in tandem with an AAMR
Sources: [34–40,84]. MOPAC = Mayor’s Ofﬁce for Policing and Crime; AAMR = Alcohol Abstinence Monitoring Requirement; VAWG = Violence Against
Women and Girls.
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professionals aired multiple objections to MOPAC’s inten-
tion to include abusers within its AAMR Pilot. A number
of these objections are summarized in Table 3, and fall
within the themes of messaging, risk and support services.
In siding with the VAWG community and exercising its
power to dictate English and Welsh penal policy, the gov-
ernment subsequently announced that MOPAC’s pilot
could not include domestic violence perpetrators. Disap-
pointment aside, Malthousewas decidedly pragmaticwhen
reﬂecting on the matter when interviewed in 2015, his at-
titude being that compromises had to be made to experi-
ment with compulsory sobriety in London, and that
positive evaluation results would bolster future attempts
to mimic the South Dakota model more closely [38].
Well, I was disappointed […] we came to the view that if
you pitch high and come in lower, you come in low
enough that you still think that the structure of the
scheme will prove its efﬁcacy and that over time people
will then start accepting moving towards the full
model’—interviewee: Kit Malthouse.
Interestingly, Malthouse’s prediction was relatively accurate.
Following what a government junior minister described as
‘very encouraging’ results, the Cameron Government
(2015–16) formally extended MOPAC’s AAMR trial for
6 months in July 2015 while discussions took place about
the pilot’s longer-term future [39–44]. MOPAC later an-
nounced that its compulsory sobriety scheme would be rolled
out in phases across the whole of London from April 2016,
and that domestic abusers would be eligible to receive an
AAMR [45–49]. This pilot concluded in summer 2018. In ad-
dition, in April 2017 permission to launch a 2-year AAMR
trial in the north of Englandwas granted by the ﬁrst May min-
istry (2016–17) [50]. This pilot is funded by the Police and
Crime Commissioners for each of the regions involved and,
notably, includes domestic violence perpetrators [51–53].
ALCOHOL TAGS
Several considerations inﬂuenced MOPAC’s decision to use
alcohol tags rather than twice-daily breathalysing to en-
sure AAMR compliance. The ﬁrst centred on macro-
domestic ﬁnancial and political constraints. MOPAC ofﬁcers
were concerned about the resource implications of
breathalyser testing, especially as they were operating
within a context of shrinking public services and probation
upheaval in the form of Transforming Rehabilitation [54–
56]. Indeed, with regard to the latter, MOPAC ofﬁcers were
reluctant to place additional strain on probation staff due
to the impending split of community service provision be-
tween the National Probation Service and private-sector
Commercial Rehabilitation Companies. A second consider-
ation centred on intrusion, with MOPAC ofﬁcials fearing
the disruption that frequently travelling to a testing site
could mount with respect to an offender’s work and/or
study routine [57]. A third consideration centred on en-
forcement. Given that alcohol tags permit continuous
monitoring of alcohol consumption, MOPAC agents were
attracted to the speed in which an AAMR infraction could
be identiﬁed [57].
Lastly, evidence suggests that MOPAC’s preference for
alcohol tags was an outcome of international and subna-
tional policy-orientated learning. MOPAC representatives
who were responsible for erecting London’s AAMR Pilot
tuned-in to the voices of those who had attained experi-
ence of deploying alcohol tags in the United Kingdom
and/or the United States. In relation to the subnational–
subnational interaction that occurred between UK-based
individuals, MOPAC ofﬁcials engaged with a district judge
who endorsed alcohol tags, having used them efﬁca-
ciously within child protection cases that were brought
to a Family Drug and Alcohol Court in London [58]. In
addition, MOPAC agents communicated with Karyn
McCluskey, a Director of the high-proﬁle Scottish Violence
Reduction Unit who had trialled alcohol tags under an ini-
tiative branded ‘Project Pegasus’ and who had become a
ﬁrm advocate for their deployment across the United
Kingdom [35,59].
I gave everything to London, all of my papers, I gave
hundreds of ﬁles […] I said ‘don’t reinvent it; here is how
to do [the pilot]’. I spoke to all the policy people down at
the Mayor’s Ofﬁce around how they should it. We all
succeed together; it is not individual—interviewee:
Karyn McCluskey.
With regard to international lesson-drawing, a week-long
fact-ﬁnding visit to the United States by a MOPAC Special
Adviser played a role in the abandonment of breathalysers.
This adviser accepted an invitation forwarded by the Na-
tional Association of Drug Court Professionals (NADCP)
to attend its Annual Training Conference in Washington,
DC [39,60–62]. While in the United States, they also visited
New York and several locations in Michigan, where they
met with criminal justice professionals, academics, pro-
gramme evaluators and private-sector providers of alcohol
tags. Upon returning to London, they made the case for
employing alcohol tags [39,56]. Indeed, they reportedly in-
formed their colleagues that almost every subnational agent
that they had spoken to in the United States had maintained
that their jurisdiction was using alcohol tags or were mov-
ing towards them not only because of the reliability of the
technology and its ability to monitor compliance around
the clock, but also because police time was being wasted
chasing those who may not have consumed alcohol yet
who had skipped a breath test [39]. Their advice was
heeded [39,56].
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OFFENDER PAYS AND ‘SWIFT, CERTAIN
AND FAIR ’ JUSTICE
Findings suggest that the ‘non-transfer’ [20] of offender
pays was a consequence of macro-state level legal incom-
patibility and meso-level Whitehall reluctance. No penal
mechanism existed in England and Wales to compel an of-
fender to pay the costs of delivering a non-ﬁnancial penalty
[63]. In addition, Ministers were disinclined to legislate in
favour of a daily ﬁne model, as civil servants within the
Ministry of Justice were concerned that a precedent would
be set whereby offenders could pay their ﬁnes gradually
and in small amounts, hence increasing administrative
pressures on the criminal justice system [64,65].
Interestingly, US–UK legal discordancy was also cited as
a reason as towhy the Governmentwould not permit those
who breached their AAMR to be ‘ﬂash incarcerated’ as
part of MOPAC’s pilot. Ministers stated that due to habeas
corpus the European Court of Human Rights could object
to offenders who breach their AAMR being detained with-
out trial [66]. The upshot was that South Dakota’s ‘skip or
fail = jail’ sequence could not be replicated. Instead, the
AAMR breach process had to align with that of any other
Community or Suspended Sentence Order as enshrined in
the Criminal Justice Act 2003 [67–69]. Unless a breach
was considered serious, the standard procedure was thus
‘query + no reasonable excuse = ﬁrst warning; query +
no reasonable excuse = breach’. Effectively, the offender
could crack once without penalty.
In reaction to this transfer obstruction, MOPAC agents
did strive to incorporate the spirit of the ‘swift, certain
and fair’ philosophy into their pilot in a manner that was
consistent with the English and Welsh criminal justice
framework. A bespoke non-compliance notiﬁcation process
was implemented that entailed staff employed by MOPAC’s
alcohol tag provider immediately contacting an offender
following a suspected breach [70]. It should be noted, how-
ever, that swift and certain acknowledgement of breach is
not analogous with ‘swift, certain and fair’ justice. Given
that completion of the AAMR breach process took up to
25 days, offenders had to wait to reappear in front of a
magistrate or judge who, in turn, selected a punishment
from a range of modest options [70]. In essence, offenders
were told: ‘If you do something that you shouldn’t we will
catch you, and if you don’t have a reasonable excuse and
satisfactory evidence you will deﬁnitely be punished at
some point in the future, thoughwhen and howexactly re-
main hazy’.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
This is the ﬁrst paper, to the author’s knowledge, to directly
examine the multi-level factors that facilitate and/or con-
strain international–subnational crime and justice policy
transfer. It is also the ﬁrst to provide a synopsis of the formu-
lation of MOPAC’s AAMR Pilot, which itself was the ﬁrst
trial in Europe to combine enforced alcohol abstinencewith
alcohol tagging [71]. Results conﬁrm that a series of
inter/transnational-, macro-domestic-, meso- and micro-
level factors served to enable and/or limit transfer pro-
cesses. They included: European policy harmonization;
technological innovation; existing English andWelsh crim-
inal justice legislation; political–economic climate; policy-
orientated learning; and agent receptivity and mobiliza-
tion. Ultimately, the architecture of MOPAC’s scheme was
a ‘synthesis’ [72] that combined ‘soft’ (i.e. ideas, goals, prin-
ciples and vocabulary) and ‘hard’ (i.e. technology, prac-
tices) elements of the South Dakota 24/7 Sobriety Project
with existing English andWelsh penal infrastructure, insti-
tutions and regulations. This outcome is far from unex-
pected. As discussed above, existing policy transfer models
have highlighted that ‘cut-and-paste’ policy transfer is un-
common and that contextual adaptation is the norm.
Nonetheless, this case study reveals a number of im-
portant ﬁndings, not least that international–subnational
crime control policy transfer is a highly complex and
contested form of policy development, even for those oper-
ating within a powerful and inﬂuential jurisdiction such as
Greater London. Years elapsed between Malthouse’s
attendance at the OPPF and the implementation of a
‘Londonized’ version of 24/7 Sobriety. Although the ﬁnd-
ings of a single case should not be used to predict future
events [26], such policy blockage suggests that, like their
national-level counterparts, subnational policymakers
may not only need to be wary of seeking to import a
ready-made overseas innovation to ‘quickly ﬁx’ a local
problem, but should also be primed to re-imagine and mu-
tate their transferred policy idea in response to domestic
resistance and structural incompatibility. Whether such
policy morphing was detrimental to the ‘success’ of
MOPAC’s pilot is a moot point. Further evaluation ﬁndings
are required before any robust claims can be made
concerning the efﬁcacy of London’s compulsory sobriety
trial. These ﬁndings are due to be published by MOPAC
later this year. Nevertheless, given that nearly 1200
AAMRs had been imposed in London by March 2018,
and that a compliance rate of more than 90% was
attained, questions concerning the necessity of faithfully
emulating 24/7 Sobriety’s cause-and-effect model are
certainly being raised [73].
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